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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),1 enacted in 1984, mandates a 
minimum fifteen-year sentence2 for defendants who unlawfully possess a firearm3 
and who also have three prior convictions for violent felonies and/or serious drug 
offenses.4  Since its inception, the ACCA has presented a weighty problem: what 
constitutes a “violent” felony?5  A seemingly self-explanatory phrase, the language 
in the statute has nevertheless proven woefully inadequate in determining what 
crimes qualify for the enhanced sentencing required under the ACCA.6 
The United States Supreme Court has made an effort to allay the confusion, most 
recently in its decision in Begay v. United States,7 requiring that violent felonies be 
purposefully violent or aggressive.8  This definition, however, along with the Court’s 
                                                           
 1 Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).  
 2 Although the prudence of mandatory minimum sentences are beyond the scope of this 
Note, there has been significant debate regarding the imposition of enhanced sentencing and 
mandatory minimums.  Compare Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws - The Issues: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (contending that eliminating mandatory minimum 
sentencing guidelines would result in sentences that are too lenient given the offense), and 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13 (1991), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports
/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/199108_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.htm (arguing that 
mandatory minimum sentences prevent crime because those who are incapacitated as a result 
of such sentences are unable to commit additional crimes while imprisoned, and that 
mandatory minimum sentences deter convicted and potential criminals from committing crime 
and that they ensure fairness in sentencing), with BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF 
RECENT FINDINGS 14 (1994), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/conmanmin.pdf 
(“Mandatory minimums have had no observable effect on crime.”). 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(4) (2006). 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
 5 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006). 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
conviction for participating in sexual intercourse with thirteen-year-old female complainant as 
a crime of violence); United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
conviction for felony attempted escape from custody as a crime of violence since it involves 
conduct that presents serious risk of physical injury to others); United States v. Hascall, 76 
F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that burglaries of commercial properties qualify as 
predicate crimes of violence for sentence-enhancement purposes); United States v. 
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction for vehicular assault while 
intoxicated as crime of violence); United States v. Weekley, 24 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to count attempted 
burglary as predicate crime of violence); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 
1991) (holding that writing threatening letters to public officials is a crime of violence). 
 7 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).  
 8 Id. at 144. 
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holding in Chambers v. United States9—seemingly relying on the pre-Begay test of 
whether the predicate offense poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another”10—has further muddied the waters regarding strict liability crimes that lack 
the requisite mens rea for violence under Begay.11  The crime colloquially referred to 
as “statutory rape” is one such crime, and the circuits are split on whether to regard it 
as a crime of violence.12  This Note questions the reasoning of circuit courts that 
have disallowed statutory rape as a violent felony post-Begay, a stance that has 
generally been supported by the argument that, as a strict liability crime13 that is 
often “consensual,” a statutory rape cannot be uniformly typified as “purposeful” or 
“aggressive.”14 
Rather than construing the acquiescence of a minor to intercourse as “consent” 
that negates the aggression required under Begay, the focus of the courts should 
instead be on the reason that the legislatures in all states have rendered sex with a 
minor a strict liability crime: a child lacks the ability to give any legally-cognizable 
consent.15  This well-settled rule of law should create a presumption that, if an adult 
knowingly engages in sexual intercourse with a minor below the age of consent, 
such intercourse is inevitably the result of a purposeful “aggression” against the 
child on the part of the offender.  Such a presumption is implied by the nature of the 
crime itself and by the manner in which the states have drafted their statutory rape 
legislation.  Adopting this rule would remedy the post-Begay confusion with regards 
to strict liability sex crimes that center on the inability of the victims to form 
consent.   
                                                           
 9 Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009). 
 10 Id. at 128. 
 11 See Begay, 553 U.S. at 145. 
 12 See Michael M. O’Hear, Seventh Circuit Decides That Reckless Injury and Statutory 
Rape Are Not “Crimes of Violence,” MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/01/27/seventh-circuit-decides-that-reckless-injury-
and-statutory-rape-are-not-crimes-of-violence/. 
 13 Statutory rape laws historically prohibited sexual conduct between persons above and 
below a codified “age of consent.”  Today, they are generally strict liability crimes, although 
some courts have allowed a mistake of age defense.  See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 
673, 677 (Cal. 1964) (allowing mistake of age defense to statutory rape charge where 
defendant held “reasonable belief” that female complainant was above the age of consent).  
See also Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare 
Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (2003); Jarrod Forster Reich, Note, The Need for a 
Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 693 (2004). 
 14 See United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 444 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Virginia statute making it a felony 
to have non-forcible sexual contact with a child between the ages of thirteen and fifteen was 
not a violent felony post-Begay); United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 
2009) (noting that “because statutory rape may involve consensual sexual intercourse . . . it 
does not necessarily involve either ‘violent’ or ‘aggressive’ conduct”). 
 15 See People v. Gonzales, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (“It has long been 
recognized that the state has the authority to regulate the sexual conduct of its minors by 
setting age limits to establish whether the individual is sufficiently mature to make intelligent 
and informed decisions and to consent to certain activities.”). 
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In furtherance of this view, Part II of this Note seeks to define statutory rape in 
light of how the elements differ by jurisdiction.  Part III explores the legislative 
history of the ACCA’s enhanced sentencing provisions and its definition of violent 
felonies for the purpose of enhanced sentencing, and compares this language to that 
of other federal sentencing guidelines.  Part IV describes the United States Supreme 
Court rulings in Begay v. United States and Chambers v. United States and how 
these cases have contributed to the ongoing evolution of the definition of a “violent 
felony” or a “crime of violence.”  Part V examines statutory rape as a predicate 
violent felony and proposes a rule that would, in accordance with Begay, presume 
aggression in the absence of consent.  Part VI considers the serious risks of physical 
harm to minors that may result from sexual activity with an adult offender, and why 
these risks should render statutory rape a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.  
Part VII concludes. 
II.  DEFINING STATUTORY RAPE: A CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY 
Modern statutory rape legislation has evolved from English common law 
property doctrines intended to preserve the interest of fathers in the chastity of their 
daughters.16  Today, statutory rape laws look to alleviate more contemporary 
concerns.17  In addition to the state’s interest in protecting minors from sexual 
intercourse and predatory relationships,18 studies conducted in the late 1990s19 
prompted lawmakers to utilize statutory rape legislation as a tool to assist in the 
prevention of teenage pregnancy and the resulting increased numbers of young 
welfare recipients.20  These studies, indicating that half of all children born to 
                                                           
 16 See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 17 (1975) (describing rape 
originating from property law regimes, where it was viewed as the theft of man’s interest in 
his daughter’s chastity).  
 17 See discussion infra Part VI.A.; see also United States v. Shannon 110 F.3d 382 (7th 
Cir. 1997).  Judge Posner asserts that:  
A further complication, so far as characterizing the purpose behind a particular 
state’s statutory-rape law is concerned, lies in the origins of these laws.  Their 
original purpose was to protect the virginity of female minors in order, in turn, to 
protect their marriageability, viewed as a girl’s or a woman’s most precious asset 
and one gravely impaired by loss of virginity. . . . Only recently has the focus of 
governmental concern with teenage sex shifted to the protection of young girls 
from pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, possible psychological harms 
incident to early commencement of sexual activity, and possible adverse social 
and economic consequences of teenage pregnancy and births out of wedlock. 
Id. at 387 (citations omitted). 
 18 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14016(b)(1) (1996) (requiring the United States Attorney General 
to implement a program establishing the links between statutory rape, teenage pregnancy, and 
predatory offenders); Martin Tolchin, More States Trying to Curb Teen-Age Pregnancies, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1990, at 24 (reporting two-thirds of states making efforts to reduce 
incidence of teenage pregnancies).   
 19 See Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective in Preventing Adolescent 
Pregnancy?, 29 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES (Jan./Feb. 1996), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2903097.html. 
 20 Id. 
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underage mothers are fathered by adult men,21 have sounded the alarm for increased 
enforcement of statutory rape laws to protect young women from exploitation and 
abuse22 and to protect children from poverty and neglect.23 
Difficulties in defining what is colloquially referred to as “statutory rape,” 
however, are immediately apparent from a comparison of the various state statutes 
criminalizing sexual contact with a minor.24  There is little agreement among the 
states as to what the age of consent is or should be.25  Indeed, only twelve states have 
a single age of consent, generally between sixteen and eighteen years of age.26  In all 
other jurisdictions, the age of consent is dependent upon age differences between the 
victim and perpetrator, the age of the victim, and the age of the defendant.27  Even 
the name of the crime differs by jurisdiction, and states often distinguish between 
those crimes involving minors above or below certain ages, offenders inside or 
outside a certain range of difference in age from the victim, or involving different 
levels of sexual activity.28   These inconsistencies render it nearly impossible to 
make sweeping assertions as to what constitutes a statutory rape.     
What is true in every jurisdiction, however, is that adult sexual contact with a 
minor is prohibited by statute,29 based on the well-settled rule of law that there exists 
an age under which an individual lacks the capacity to legally consent to sexual 
activity.30  However, a distinction must be made between sexual activity involving 
minors who are of a socially-acceptable (albeit arbitrary) age to give assent, or 
“consent-in-fact”31 to sexual activity, and sexual activity involving minors below this 
age.  This distinction is evident in the manner in which many states’ statutory rape 
                                                           
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Sandra Norman-Eady, Christopher Reinhart & Peter Martino, Statutory Rape Laws By 
State, OLR RESEARCH REPORT (Apr. 14, 2003), available at  
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-r-0376.htm.  
 25 Id.  A survey of state statutory rape laws shows that age differentials between 
defendants and complainants range from two to ten years.    
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.  Statutory language signifying sexual conduct includes “sexual intercourse,” “sexual 
conduct,” “sexual penetration,” “lewd and lascivious conduct,” “indecent liberties,” and 
“illicit connection.”  See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE 
TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 44 (1996).     
 29 See Norman-Eady et al., supra note 24. 
 30 See United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2010).  There is much 
debate regarding adolescents’ aptitude for making mature choices regarding sex.  For a critque 
of statutory rape laws and the proposition that some adolescents can make these choices in an 
informed manner, see Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of 
Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287 (1997).  
 31 See United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he sex at 
issue in statutory rape may be consensual as a matter of fact, even if the law disregards or 
countermands the victim’s decision.”). 
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laws are drafted, with penalties for adult/minor sexual intercourse increasing as the 
child’s age decreases.32  This Note presumes that the victim is of sufficient age to 
give consent-in-fact to the sexual activity, and therefore the assertions herein are 
limited to victims in the general range of twelve to seventeen years of age.33  
Accordingly, statutory rape is to be understood as sexual activity that would be legal 
if not for the age of at least one of the parties.34 
III.  THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT AND THE ADVENT OF THE “VIOLENT 
FELONY” 
A.  Legislative History 
Enacted by Congress in 198435 as a response to research indicating that a small 
number of recidivist offenders were responsible for a significant percentage of 
crimes,36 the Armed Career Criminal Act mandated a minimum prison term of 
fifteen years for any person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) if that person had three previous convictions for 
robbery or burglary.37  The House Report quotes Senator Arlen Specter, the sponsor 
of the legislation, in his assertion that burglary was one of the “‘most damaging 
crimes to society’ because it involves ‘invasion of [victims’] homes or workplaces, 
[and] violation of their privacy . . . .’”38 
                                                           
 32 Norman-Eady et al., supra note 24. 
 33 Twelve years of age is the lowest age, of all the states, below which sexual activity is 
considered first degree rape.  For a detailed chart of ages of consent state-by-state, see id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 130 CONG. REC. 28,096 (1984). 
 36 H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1-2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661-62; 
see also Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 19 (1986) [hereinafter ACCA Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Specter) (“I have long been convinced that if we could put 200,000 career 
criminals in jail in this country, we could reduce violent crime by 50 percent.”). 
 37 Both Senator Specter and Representative Wyden introduced bills in their respective 
Houses of Congress that would have omitted mention of burglaries or robberies from the 
original version of the ACCA, substituting the phrase “crime of violence,” which was defined 
as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another,” or any felony that, “by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in 
the course of committing the offense.”  See H.R. 4639, 99th Cong. (1986).  In response to the 
proposals by Specter and Wyden, Representatives Hughes and McCollum introduced a bill 
also eliminating burglaries and robberies as enumerated offenses, but defining the “violent 
felony” as any state or federal felony that has as an element the “use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”  H.R. 4768, 99th Cong. 
(1986). 
 38 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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Due to the narrow scope of the original provision, the 1984 version of the ACCA 
failed to accomplish its purpose: incarcerating recidivist criminals.39  In 1986, the 
Subcommittee on Crime heard testimony on whether to expand the predicate 
offenses of robbery and burglary to include serious drug offenses and other violent 
felonies in the provisions of the ACCA.40  The subcommittee hearing sought to 
determine what, if any, additional felonies should be included in its definition of a 
“violent felony.”  As the Court noted in Taylor v. United States, 
Congress singled out burglary (as opposed to other frequently committed 
property crimes such as larceny and auto theft) for inclusion as a predicate 
offense . . . because of its inherent potential for harm to persons. . . . There 
never was any proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special 
subclass of burglaries that might be especially dangerous, such as those 
where the offender is armed, or the building is occupied, or the crime 
occurs at night.41 
In its 1986 amended form, the ACCA added arson, extortion, and crimes 
involving explosives to the enumerated offenses of robbery and burglary, and 
defined violent felonies as those crimes “punishable for a prison term of more than 
one year that involve conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to 
another.”42  This amendment to the original language was the beginning of the 
debate and the myriad circuit splits surrounding how and what to define as a violent 
felony. 
B.  The “Crime of Violence” and the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
The amended ACCA “violent felony” definition was later adopted by other 
federal sentence enhancement initiatives.43  The United States Sentencing 
Commission, established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,44 was created 
specifically to provide “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant.”45  To do this, the Sentencing 
Commission established the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) in order 
to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing [and avoid] 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
                                                           
 39 See, e.g., ACCA Hearing supra note 36, at 9 (testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General James Knapp) (reporting that as of 1986, only fourteen people had been imprisoned 
under the ACCA). 
 40 H.R. REP. NO. 99-849 (1986). 
 41 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588. 
 42 Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-39 
(1986). 
 43 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2007).  The federal “crime of 
violence” definition has also been used in statutes with civil remedies for victims of violent 
crimes.  See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2) (1994).   
 44 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2017 (1984) (creating the United States Sentencing Commission). 
 45 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (1993). 
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been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.”46  Under the USSG, career offenders 
receive enhanced sentences based in part on their criminal history.47 
Following the 1986 amending of the ACCA, the Sentencing Commission 
likewise amended the USSG to encompass the new violent felony definition as part 
of a determination of career offender status.48  Known under the USSG as “crimes of 
violence,” the Commission correctly predicted that the new Guidelines definition 
would be more readily embraced by Congress and federal sentencing judges because 
it tracked the congressionally-approved language of 18 U.S.C. 924(e).49  Given these 
parallels in language, courts have recognized that any interpretation of a “crime of 
violence” under the USSG is persuasive when interpreting whether a crime is a 
“violent felony” under the ACCA, and vice versa.50 
C.  Categorical Approach 
In approaching the question of whether an offense is a violent felony under the 
ACCA, courts have traditionally used one of three approaches: the categorical 
approach,51 the modified categorical approach,52 and the fact-based approach,53 each 
                                                           
 46 United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1993). 
 47 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2007) (“A defendant is a career 
offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant 
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony 
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.”). 
 48 The Guidelines originally took their definition of the “crime of violence” from an 
amendment to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.  See 18 U.S.C. 16 (1994) (defining 
“‘crime of violence’” as either “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or “any . . . offense 
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense”). 
 49 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CAREER OFFENDER WORK GROUP REPORT 24 (1987) 
(“The [work] group’s general feeling is that because the penalties imposed by this guideline 
are so severe, linking the definitions of predicate crimes to those already approved, defined 
and joined together by Congress for the heavy sanction of 924(e) would facilitate both the 
acceptance of the guideline and its proper application.”). 
 50 See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 51 Under this approach, the court does not delve into the specific conduct of the defendant, 
but looks only to the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction under the relevant statute.  
See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that statutory rape 
is a crime of violence under the categorical approach). 
 52 Under the modified categorical approach, the sentencing court will examine the facts 
relating to the underlying conviction contained in the charging papers, the indictment, or 
information to determine whether an offense involves conduct that presents a “serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”  See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 
382, 389 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old was a crime 
of violence using the modified categorical approach).  
 53 Under the fact-based approach, courts examine any and all facts surrounding prior 
convictions rather than limiting their inquiries to any specific documents.  A court may review 
the record of the prior proceeding or hold evidentiary hearings to determine whether the 
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of which has strengths, weaknesses, and varying degrees of support.54  Use of the 
categorical approach—which requires that the sentencing court look only to the fact 
of conviction in determining whether an offense is a predicate violent felony for 
enhanced sentencing—has been mandated by the Court in the seminal case on 
violent felony determinations: Taylor v. United States.55  Taylor does, however, 
allow for the use of a modified categorical approach in the narrow range of cases 
where the statutory definition of the offense is ambiguous or so broad in scope that it 
encompasses both violent felonies and other crimes that would not qualify as a 
predicate felony under the statute.56  In such cases, the court may consider extrinsic 
evidence, but such evidence is limited to “‘the terms of the charging document, the 
terms of a plea agreement . . . or to some comparable judicial record of this 
information’”57 in order to determine that the crime is a violent felony as defined by 
the ACCA.   
The Taylor exception to strict use of the categorical approach is particularly 
relevant to statutory rape statutes.  Often, charges brought under such statutes hinge 
on the age of the victim or the perpetrator—information not readily gleaned from the 
statutory definition of the offense—or simultaneously criminalize actual sexual 
contact with a minor (i.e. intercourse) and “victimless” sexual conduct such as 
possession of child pornography.58  This broad scope sometimes requires that courts 
utilize a modified categorical approach in determining whether statutory rape is a 
predicate violent felony for enhanced sentencing,59 without sacrificing the equity of 
the categorical approach.   
IV.  RECONCILING BEGAY V. UNITED STATES AND CHAMBERS V. UNITED STATES 
A.  Deconstructing Begay v. United States 
After a night of heavy drinking in September 2004, Larry Begay accosted his 
aunt and sister with a rifle, demanded money, and threatened to shoot if they failed 
to comply.  When informed that they had no money, Mr. Begay repeatedly pulled the 
                                                           
previous conviction was a crime of violence that would constitute a predicate felony for 
enhanced sentencing.  See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(Allowing the use of an interview-based reliance on a pre-sentence report to determine 
whether the defendant’s burglary convictions were for burglaries of a “dwelling”). 
 54 See Susan Fleischmann, Comment, Toward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statutory Rape 
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 425, 429 (1998) 
(positing that the fact-based approach is the sole way of allowing the courts to consider the 
facts of a case in totality prior to making a determination that a predicate offense is a crime of 
violence). 
 55 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).   
 56 Id at 602.  (“This categorical approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to go 
beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually 
required to find all the elements of generic burglary.”) 
 57 United States v. France, 394 F. App’x 246, 248 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Bartee, 529 F.3d 357, 358 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 58 United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 59 See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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trigger of the unloaded gun.60  After his arrest, Begay admitted being an eight-time 
felon, having been convicted twelve times of driving under the influence (“DUI”),61 
a crime that, under New Mexico law, becomes a felony the fourth (and each 
subsequent) time an individual commits it.62  Following his guilty plea for unlawful 
possession of a firearm, the sentencing judge determined that Begay’s prior DUI 
convictions were for crimes “‘punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year,’” and involved “‘conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.’”63  Accordingly, Begay was sentenced under the ACCA’s 
enhanced sentencing provisions requiring a mandatory minimum prison term of 
fifteen years.64  On appeal, Begay argued that driving under the influence was not a 
crime of violence under the ACCA.65  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed.66 
Upon granting certiorari, the Begay Court, in an entirely new interpretation of the 
“otherwise” clause of the ACCA, 67 determined that to qualify as a violent felony, 
the offense must “‘typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,’”68 
as do the enumerated offenses that precede the “otherwise” clause.69  Additionally, 
the Court held that to qualify as a predicate violent felony, an offense must be 
“roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [statutory] 
examples” of burglary, arson, extortion, and offenses involving the use of 
explosives.70  Using this standard, the Court found that DUI, a strict liability crime 
requiring no culpable mens rea, could not constitute a predicate felony offense under 
the ACCA because it did not typically involve “purposeful” conduct of the kind 
associated with robbery, burglary, or drug offenses.71 
B.  Where Does Chambers v. United States Fit? 
Less than a year post-Begay, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Chambers v. United States72 on the question of whether failure to report, as distinct 
from felony escape, is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA’s enhanced 
                                                           
 60 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 140 (2008). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 155-56. 
 64 Id. at 155. 
 65 Id. at 140. 
 66 Id. 
 67 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (known as the “otherwise” or “residual” clause of 
the ACCA). 
 68 Begay, 553 U.S. at 158 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 144; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 70 Begay, 553 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added). 
 71 Id. at 145. 
 72 Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009).  
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sentencing provisions.73  Having pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, Deondery Chambers was sentenced to roughly fifteen and a half years in 
prison under the ACCA.74  On appeal, Chambers argued that his prior conviction for 
escape was not a predicate violent felony.75  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
sentence, although Judge Posner noted that, for purposes of enhanced sentencing 
under the ACCA, a clear distinction should be made between a violent escape and a 
peaceful failure to report.76 
The Supreme Court made just such a distinction in Chambers v. United States, 
holding that a failure to report is not a violent felony under the ACCA.77  Seven 
months after Begay, the Court concluded that failure to report did not reach the level 
required for enhanced sentencing because it does not involve conduct that is 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive,78 a finding in line with its narrow construction of 
the “otherwise” clause in Begay.79  However, the inquiry did not end there.  Instead, 
the Court then focused its attention on whether a failure to report “‘involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’”80  Concluding 
that failure to report did not involve such risk and thus was not within the purview of 
the ACCA, the Court appeared to rely on the pre-Begay standard of evaluating the 
“otherwise” clause in terms of risk of injury rather than similarity in kind with the 
enumerated offenses. 81  Additionally, the Court seemed to relegate the Begay 
requirements to a passing observation, noting that “[c]onceptually speaking, [failure 
to report] amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from . . . ‘purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.’”82  This apparent departure from Begay further confused the 
inquiry regarding what offenses qualify as violent felonies and what standard should 
be used to make such a determination.  
C.  Resolving the Uncertainty 
In his Begay dissent, Justice Alito (joined by Justices Souter and Thomas) took to 
task the “purposeful,” “violent,” and “aggressive” standards established by the 
majority as wholly inconsistent with the language of the statute.83  Citing the 
Webster’s Dictionary definition of “otherwise”—”in a different manner”84—Alito 
                                                           
 73 Id. at 122. 
 74 Id. at 124. 
 75 United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 76 Id. at 727. 
 77 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 130 (2009). 
 78 Id. at 128. 
 79 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008). 
 80 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122 (2009). 
 81 Violent felonies must be “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to 
the [statutory] examples” of burglary, arson, extortion, and offenses involving use of 
explosives. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added).  
 82 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (2009). 
 83 Begay, 553 U.S. at 155 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 84 Id. at 159. 
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asserted that any similarities between a crime that presents a “serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another” and the named statutory offenses of burglary, arson, 
and extortion need not be in kind, but must merely, “in a different manner,” pose a 
serious risk of physical injury.85  Any other requirements (i.e. that the crime be 
purposeful, violent, or aggressive) would amount to adding new language to the 
statute, a practice that is to be resisted by the Court.86  In yet another interpretation of 
the “otherwise” clause, Justice Scalia in his Begay concurrence suggested a test that 
would center on the question of “risk.”87  Dismissing the majority decision as a 
“regrettable continuation of a piecemeal, suspenseful, Scrabble-like approach to the 
interpretation of this statute,”88 Justice Scalia came to the same conclusion regarding 
the Begay test as did Alito, Souter and Thomas: that the “purposeful” “violent” and 
“aggressive” test bears no resemblance to the plain language of the statute or, by 
extension, the intent of Congress.89 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, reiterated the concerns he voiced in his 
Begay concurrence in his concurrence in Chambers.90  While commending the 
efforts of his colleagues to develop a workable test of the “otherwise” clause while 
retaining the categorical approach adopted in Taylor,91 Alito nonetheless stressed the 
apparent impossibility of consistent application of the “otherwise” clause.92  Citing 
the circuit splits that have resulted from an attempt to balance the “otherwise” clause 
with the categorical approach93 and noting that these splits could “occupy this Court 
                                                           
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 150 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is simply no basis (other than the necessity of 
resolving the present case) for holding that the enumerated and unenumerated crimes must be 
similar in respects other than the degree of risk that they pose.”) (emphasis in original). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 152. 
 90 Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 131 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 91 Id. at 131-32. 
 92 Id. at 132. 
 93 Id. at 133 n.2.  There has been little consistency in the application of the “otherwise” 
clause using the categorical approach.  Justice Alito notes the myriad circuit splits that have 
resulted from attempts to reconcile the two: 
[T]he lower courts have split over whether it is a “violent felony” under ACCA’s 
residual clause to commit rape, compare United States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732 
(6th Cir. 2005) (statutory rape not categorically violent), with United States v. 
Williams, 120 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 1997) (inducement of minor to commit sodomy 
violent), and United States v. Thomas, 231 F. App’x. 765 (9th Cir. 2007) (all rape 
violent); retaliate against a government officer, compare United States v. 
Montgomery, 402 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2005) (not violent), with Sawyers, supra 
(violent); attempt or conspire to commit burglary, compare United States v. Fell, 
511 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2007) (even after James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 
(2007), and even where statute requires an overt act, conspiracy to commit 
burglary not violent), with United States v. Moore, 108 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(attempted burglary violent if statute requires proof of overt act); carry a 
concealed weapon, compare United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 
 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/7
2012] RESOLVING THE POST-BEGAY MAELSTROM 519 
for years,”94 Justice Alito concluded that each new application seems to lead the 
Court further away from the plain language of the statute, and suggests that Congress 
revisit the ACCA and “formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes”95 that 
would qualify as predicate violent offenses under the ACCA. 
Notwithstanding these critiques, it is possible to reconcile Chambers and Begay.  
While Chambers appears to rely on the pre-Begay standard of “serious risk of 
physical harm” as the test of a violent felony—seemingly a departure from the 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive test outlined in Begay—Chambers in fact merely 
clarifies that the test of a violent felony is twofold.  In other words, a predicate 
violent felony is one that is purposeful, violent, and aggressive  (or similar in kind to 
the enumerated offenses) and one that involves conduct that poses a serious risk of 
physical harm to another (or similar in degree of risk posed to the enumerated 
offenses).  However, as evidenced by the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Begay and Chambers, the subsequent case law and resulting circuit splits, clarity on 
what crimes fall within the Court’s definition of a violent felony remains elusive.   
V.  STATUTORY RAPE: SIMILAR “IN KIND” TO THE ENUMERATED OFFENSES  
The central proposition asserted by the Begay Court is that there exists a unifying 
thread amongst the enumerated offenses of the ACCA, and that this common factor 
is the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct involved.  However, there are 
further commonalities.  Burglary, as Senator Specter alluded, involves an intrusion 
upon the sanctity of our private space—our homes.96  Arson and the use of 
explosives carry the potential for loss of life and long-term financial devastation.  
Extortion may begin as a rather innocuous crime and quickly escalate to a violent 
endeavor.  While on first blush statutory rape bears little resemblance to these 
crimes, it indeed shares these crucial linking traits.  Sexual intercourse between an 
adult and a minor, like burglary and robbery, carries with it the invasion of the 
victim’s most personal space and human dignity.97  Sexual conduct even between 
consenting adults may result in a deadly sexually transmitted disease or pregnancy.98   
                                                           
1990) (not violent), with United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(violent); and possess a sawed-off shotgun as a felon, compare United States v. 
Amos, 501 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2007) (not violent), with United States v. Bishop, 
453 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (violent).  Compare also United States v. Sanchez-
Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle not a 
“violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which closely resembles ACCA’s 
residual clause), with United States v. Reliford, 471 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(automobile tampering violent under ACCA’s residual clause), and United States 
v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle a “violent felony” under § 16(b)). 
Id. 
 94 Id. at 133. 
 95 Id. at 134. 
 96 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990). 
 97 For the parallels between robbery and its similarities to sexual activity, see Susan 
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1152 (1986). 
 98 See discussion infra Part VI. 
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Further, given the age, maturity, and possible size and strength disparities between 
victim and perpetrator, a genuine concern exists that any sexual conduct between 
adults and minors, regardless of the assent of the victim, can quickly escalate to an 
aggressive or forceful encounter. 
A.  Addressing the “Purposefully” Requirement 
As Justices Scalia and Alito have noted, requiring that predicate violent felonies 
be purposeful, violent, and aggressive runs afoul of the statutory language.99  
However, even accepting this portion of the test, statutory rape should qualify as a 
crime of violence for purposes of enhanced sentencing under the ACCA because it 
involves not only aggressive conduct, but also a degree of purpose on the part of the 
perpetrator.  Since Begay,100 courts in several jurisdictions have shown reluctance to 
find that strict liability crimes such as statutory rape possess the requisite intent to 
qualify as a crime of violence.101  The reason for this reluctance is clear: Begay itself 
concerned the strict liability crime of driving under the influence and specifically 
rejected the notion that a strict liability crime lacking any purposeful mens rea is a 
violent felony.102  It is the nature of the crimes themselves, however, that renders the 
two strict liability offenses distinct from one other, and these differences are crucial 
to our understanding of the ramifications of the Begay “purposefully” requirement 
on statutory rape versus driving under the influence.  Where statutory rape laws 
generally require, at a minimum, intentional sexual conduct with an individual 
legally unable to consent,103 driving under the influence is a crime of recklessness or 
negligence.104 
Of course, one might argue that the act of having sex is intentional, as is the act 
of driving, and that mistake as to the age of a sexual partner is similar to the 
negligence involved in drunk driving.105  Where these two strict liability crimes 
diverge is that drunk driving may or may not result in an imposition on the person or 
property of another and is often “victimless” in that, frequently, no one is physically 
or financially injured by the negligent or reckless intoxicated driver.106  Adult-minor 
sexual activity should be distinguished from the strict liability crime of driving under 
the influence because, unlike DUI, sexual intercourse always involves the interplay 
                                                           
 99 See discussion infra Part VI; Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 159 (2008) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 100 Begay, 553 U.S. at 137. 
 101 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 444 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 
1093 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 102 Begay, 553 U.S. at 145-46. 
 103 Norman-Eady et al., supra note 24. 
 104 United States v. Rooks, 556 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 105 For a discussion of mistake-of-age defenses, see generally People v. Hernandez, 393 
P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).  
 106 See, e.g., Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, Vital Signs: Alcohol Impaired Driving 
Among Adults - United States, 2010, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6039a4.htm (“An average drunk driver 
has driven drunk 80 times before first arrest.”) 
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between one’s personal autonomy and that of another.  This is the case even where 
the act is between consenting adults, but the psychological, physiological, and 
emotional impact is far greater in adult-minor sexual relations.107 
Further, statutory rape is proscribed by the statutes of all fifty states because it is 
recognized that children lack the emotional and/or physical maturity to consent to 
sexual activity and all that flows from it.  Conversely, the adult perpetrator is 
expected to have the ability to appreciate the ramifications, risks, and rewards of 
sexual contact as well as to conduct due diligence as to the age of his or her partner.  
For these reasons, if an adult intentionally engages in a sex act with someone unable 
to give legally-cognizable consent—regardless of any mistake as to the age of the 
victim—it is the adult who bears the sole criminal and civil liability for the 
encounter.  Completion of a sex act with an individual who is, in fact, below the age 
of consent therefore can be legitimately construed as affirmative conduct by the 
defendant.108  As the Second Circuit found in Daye, a post-Begay case, completion of 
such an act is sufficient to satisfy Begay’s requirement that the crime be one of 
purpose, even absent any culpable mens rea required by the statute itself.109 
B.  Rape Statutes as a Benchmark: Defining Force and Violence 
Spurred by the feminist theory era of the 1970’s,110 the societal view of rape has 
evolved from the “crime of passion” to the crime of violence and aggression.111  The 
characterization of rape as a violent crime is evidenced by the move of state 
legislatures toward shifting the statutory definitions of rape closer to those of assault 
and battery.112  In fact, many states have changed their very terminology, classifying 
                                                           
 107 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 108 United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Susan Brownmiller pioneered the theory of rape as a crime of violence, describing it as 
“a societal problem resulting from a distorted masculine philosophy of aggression,” and “not a 
crime of lust but of violence and power.”  BROWNMILLER, supra note 16, at 400; see also 
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 85 (1987) (“Rape is a crime of violence, not 
sexuality”); Estrich, supra note 97, at 1089-92 (“rape . . . celebrates male aggressiveness”).  
 111 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  The trend toward defining rape as a violent 
crime is outlined in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796.  See MAJORITY STAFF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 103d CONG., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: 
DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE (1993) (quoting Senator Joe Biden: “[T]here are . . . 
crimes—namely rape and family violence—that disproportionately burden women.”). 
 112 Using assault and battery statutes as a guide, almost all state rape statutes have now 
been amended to: 1) establish and emphasize forces as an element of the crime; and 2) 
eliminate the requirement that the victim have resisted the assault.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a, 750.520b (West 1991) (categorizing sexual intercourse as a first-
degree felony if achieved by the use or threat of physical force).  
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rape as “sexual assault”113 and emphasizing the defendant’s use of force as an 
element of the offense.114 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “force” as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure 
directed against a person or thing.”115  On the other hand, “power” is defined as 
“[d]ominance, control, or influence.”116  Considering “force” and “power” as legal 
terms of art, it becomes clear that a sex offense can be forcible absent any physical 
force.  This is so because the law requires only compulsion (or “pressure”) to find 
force, and that compulsion can be accomplished through an exertion of power 
wholly devoid of any physical violence.117  The disparity in power, influence, and 
physical stature that exists in many adult-minor sexual relationships can easily foster 
an atmosphere in which forceful, violent, or aggressive behavior will be utilized to 
ensure compliance.  This is so because a child has little recourse in deterring a 
“stronger, more mature” adult from using such force.118  These disparities are 
directly in line with the legally-accepted definition of force as the exertion of undue 
power. 
Despite the increasing societal conception of rapes as crimes of violence, a 
victim’s consent to sexual conduct continues to be the primary factor in determining 
whether the conduct was rape.  In cases involving “date rape,” or “acquaintance 
rape,” where the type and level of force used may be unclear,119 modern courts have 
recognized that it is the lack of consent to sexual activity that renders an act 
“violent.”120  In such cases, where the only force deemed necessary to meet the 
statute’s force requirement is that necessary to accomplish the sexual act, the crucial 
question is whether or not there was consent.121  Nowhere is this reliance on the 
presence or absence of consent more relevant than when determining whether 
statutory rape should qualify as a predicate violent felony for enhanced sentencing.   
                                                           
 113 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-12 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 
(West 1995) (defining the crime of “sexual assault”). 
 114 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
13 (West 1993) (“The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an 
act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force . . . .”).  
 115 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 1999). 
 116 Id. at 1207. 
 117 United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. 
Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 118 See United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 232 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
 119 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(“‘[He] put me down on the bed.  It was kind of like—he didn’t throw me on the bed.  It’s 
hard to explain.  It was kind of like a push but no. . . . It wasn’t slow like a romantic kind of 
thing, but it wasn’t a fast shove either.  It was kind of in the middle.’”). 
 120 See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). The court found that 
engaging in intercourse with the sleeping victim constituted sexual assault, even though the 
defendant stopped when the victim awoke and requested he do so.    
 121 Id. at 1277-78. 
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C.  Should Consent-in-Fact Be a Factor? 
Even prior to Begay, some district courts were reluctant to construe statutory rape 
as a “violent” felony, because unlike “pure” rape and sexual assault statutes, 
statutory rape laws generally do not have the use of force as an element.122  
However, pre-Begay courts in several circuits recognized that the inability of a minor 
to give any legally-cognizable consent to sex meant that even sexual conduct under 
the guise of assent by the victim was necessarily forcible.123  As the district court 
noted in United States v. Wilcox, “any purported consent is invalid.  And if you take 
consent out of the statutory rape, or take consent out of sexual intercourse, then what 
you end up with is a crime of violence.”124   
This is the rational rule.  Because minors cannot give consent, statutory rapes are 
arguably on equal footing with rapes involving the use or threat of physical force—
the perpetrator continues with the act although they have not received any legally-
recognized consent.125  This concept has been applied to the definition of crimes of 
violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which expressly defines a 
crime of violence, in relevant part, as including “forcible sex offenses (including 
where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where 
consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced)”126 and “statutory 
rape.”127  Statutory rape is included among the enumerated offenses alongside 
forcible sex offenses because, if a minor is incapable of consent, the crime 
necessarily involves a sexual act performed “against” a child.128 
It stands to reason that consent-in-fact should not be considered in a 
determination of whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA.  In a statutory 
                                                           
 122 See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 150 F. App’x 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Perez-Velasquez, 67 F. App’x 890, 892 (6th Cir. 2003)).  
 123 Perez-Velasquez, 67 F. App’x at 892.   
 124 Wilcox, 150 F. App’x at 461. 
 125 Pre-Begay, at least two circuits made a distinction between a sexual offense that results 
from force and a sexual offense that is committed in the absence of consent.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that “forcible sex 
offense” requires use of force that is violent in nature); United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 
F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an act against the will of the victim is not a 
forcible sex offense unless there is also force or threat of force); United States v. Sarmiento-
Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2004) (nonconsensual intercourse is not “forcible”).  
But see, e.g., United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that requiring a forcible sex offense “to contain the same level of force required to 
qualify a crime under the catch-all provision would . . . render[] the enumeration 
superfluous”); United States v. Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(addressing whether nonconsensual sexual contact constitutes a forcible sex offense and 
concluding that “[w]hen an offense involves sexual contact with another person, it is 
necessarily forcible when that person does not consent”); United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 
789, 796 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a forcible sexual offense may be committed without the 
employment of physical force).  
 126 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2010) (emphasis 
added). 
 127 Id. 
 128 United States v. Chavarriya-Mejia, 367 F.3d 1249, 1251 (2004).   
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rape case, there exists no legally-cognizable distinction between legal consent and 
consent-in-fact.  Finding such a distinction would fly in the face of the intent behind 
every statutory rape statute—the accepted socio-legal principle that minors below 
the age of consent may not consent.129  As Judge Torruella aptly noted in Aguiar v. 
Gonzales, “we would be saying that persons under the age of sixteen cannot consent, 
except when they do consent.”130 
If our courts operate under the legal assumptions that; (1) legally invalid consent 
is indistinguishable from non-consent; (2) in a statutory rape, there exists no legally 
recognized consent even if the minor assented to the sexual activity; (3) force is the 
exertion of undue power or pressure; and (4) non-consent constitutes force, then, 
taken to its logical conclusion, a statutory rape will invariably involve the use of 
force as it is understood by our legal system, even if that force is only that “exertion 
of undue power” needed to accomplish the sex act.131 
VI.  SIMILAR IN “DEGREE OF RISK POSED” TO THE ENUMERATED OFFENSES:  SERIOUS 
RISK OF PHYSICAL HARM 
A.  What is the Harm? 
The infringement on personal autonomy inherent to any sexual conduct is 
exacerbated in cases of statutory rape, and, where it concerns minors of insufficient 
age to cope with the psychological ramifications of sexual intercourse, presents 
serious risks of harm to the psyche of that minor.   Teenaged girls are arguably 
incapable of making informed decisions regarding sexual activity,132 and are 
certainly particularly susceptible to abuse and exploitation.  Notwithstanding the dire 
psychological harms that may result from adult-minor sexual activity, however, the 
“otherwise” clause of the ACCA is satisfied only where there exists a risk of 
physical harm similar to that posed by those offenses enumerated in the statute.   
                                                           
 129 Concerns exist that construing statutory rape as a violent felony under the ACCA could 
sweep in consensual sexual activity between teenagers if there is no required age gap in the 
statute.  See United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 46 (1st Cir. 2007).  Conceivably, those 
situations would not present a serious risk of potential injury.  However, most states have 
created exemptions to “Romeo and Juliet” charges of statutory rape in situations where both 
partners are below the age of consent and several have moved away from strict construction of 
the age of consent, increasingly passing legislation mandating either an age gap of between 
two and six years between the perpetrator and the defendant, or that the defendant be of a 
minimum age—generally twenty-one to twenty-six years old.  See ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., 
THE LEWIN GROUP, STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS (2004), available at http://www.4parents.gov/sexrisky/statutoryrapelaws.pdf. 
Finally, many enhanced sentencing statutes have as an element the requirement that the 
defendant have reached the age of 18 at the time of their conviction for each violent felony.  
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2007). (“A defendant is a career 
offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant 
committed the instant offense of conviction. . . .”). 
 130 Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2006).   
 131 See, e.g., Florida v. Sedia, 614 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).  
 132 See Kitrosser, supra note 30, at 289. (“It is far too simplistic to suggest that adolescent 
girls are incapable of making consensual sexual choices in all instances.”). 
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Pre-Begay, the key question addressed by the courts in determining whether a 
statutory rape conviction was a crime of violence rested squarely with the 
“otherwise” clause of the ACCA, which provides that a crime that “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” 
qualifies that crime as a predicate violent felony for purposes of enhanced 
sentencing.133  Using only that standard, most courts were willing to find that 
statutory rape posed such a risk to minors, either because they “inherently involve 
physical force against the children,”134 present a “substantial risk that physical force 
will be used to ensure a child’s compliance,”135 because the “smaller, weaker” victim 
is likely to be injured in the course of sexual activity,136 or because sexual 
intercourse naturally exposes the minor to possible transmission of “social or 
venereal diseases.”137  These concerns—that minors can be injured by the sex act 
itself and that they are subject to increased risks of pregnancy and transmission of 
sexually transmitted disease—are central to the question of whether a serious risk of 
physical harm exists when an adult enters into a sexual relationship with a minor.  If 
these risks are serious in a manner similar to the risks involved in a typical instance 
of the enumerated offenses—robbery, burglary, extortion, or the use of explosives—
statutory rape should fall under the umbrella of those crimes that will qualify as 
predicate violent felonies for purposes of the enhanced sentencing mandated by the 
ACCA.   
1.  Physical Injury from the Sex Act 
In many jurisdictions, it is well-settled that most “indecent sexual contact crimes 
perpetrated by adults against children categorically present a serious potential risk of 
physical injury.”138  However, some courts have found that consensual sex with a 
minor creates a serious potential risk of injury only where there exists some 
aggravating factor, such as the minor being less than thirteen or fourteen years of 
age.139  It is certainly true that the likelihood of physical injury from sexual activity 
increases as the child’s age decreases.140  Aside from the physical considerations, a 
younger child is likely to have “poorer judgment, less knowledge about sex, and less 
                                                           
 133 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 134 United States v. Chavarriya-Mejia, 367 F.3d 1249, 1251 (2004). 
 135 United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 871 (10th Cir. 2005)).   
 136 United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 46 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 
219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998)).   
 137 United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008).   
 138 Cadieux, 500 F.3d at 45.   
 139 United States v. Bartee, 529 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2008).  The existence of a familial 
relationship between the defendant and the complainant may also be an aggravating factor.  
See United States v. Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 396 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that a conviction 
for sexual contact with a minor was a crime of violence because “[a]lthough the crime can 
occur through mere consented touching . . . there is a real possibility that physical force may 
be used in making sexual contact, particularly when the victim is a minor between 13 and 16 
and within the strictures of familiarity and proximity bred by kinship”).   
 140 United States v. Champion, 248 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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money,”141 rendering them much less likely to use or insist that their adult partner 
use appropriate measures to prevent pregnancy and disease.142  As legislatures 
increasingly move towards age-gap restrictions143 and decreased ages of consent,144 it 
will become more likely that the children covered by statutory rape laws are those 
most susceptible to physical injury.   
It is clear, however, that statutory rape presents serious risks of physical harm 
even to older teens, and courts should not limit these risks to the direct physical 
consequences of adult-minor intercourse.  Statutory rape laws seek to protect those 
who are incapable of consenting to sex because of physical or emotional 
immaturity,145 and, in the case of young teens, the physical ramifications of sex with 
an adult may be great even where consent-in-fact exists.146  Physical and other injury 
is a foreseeable risk even in the course of ordinary sexual encounters between 
consenting adults.  Intercourse between an adult and an older teen, while perhaps 
less likely to result in physical injury resulting from the sex act itself, may still 
expose the victim to the risk of pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease, or emotional 
                                                           
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Noy S. Davis & Jennifer Twombly, State Legislators’ Handbook for Statutory Rape 
Issues, (Feb. 2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/statutoryrape/handbook/issu.html. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory 
Rape Law, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 109, 112 (2004) (“Although it is conceivable that a 
teenage girl might ‘consent’ to sexual intercourse in some circumstances, the seemingly facile 
conclusion that so long as she consents, any act of intercourse with her is freely chosen and, 
therefore, legally permissible is troubling.”).  Oberman argues that meaningful consent can be 
an elusive concept in relation to teenaged girls: 
The stories girls tell about the “consensual” sex in which they engage reflect a 
poignant subtext of hope and pain.  Girls express longing for emotional 
attachment, romance, and respect.  At the same time, they suffer enormous 
insecurity and diminished self-image. . . . Girls negotiate access to the fulfillment 
of these emotional needs by way of sex.  A girl who wants males to find her 
attractive . . . might reasonably consent to sex with a popular boy. . . . Even if they 
defy legal categorization, construing these sexual encounters as anything but 
scary, painful, shaming, and/or unpleasurable for the minor girls involved requires 
people to strain their imaginations. 
Id. at 164-65.  Other sociologists question whether teens are comfortable refusing sexual 
advances by either adult or minor partners.  See, e.g., SUSAN MOORE & DOREEN ROSENTHAL, 
SEXUALITY IN ADOLESCENCE 99 (1993) (citing a study showing that 40% of adolescents felt 
unable or uncertain about their ability to refuse a partner’s sexual advances). 
 146 United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Sacko, 
247 F.3d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2001)) (summarizing studies indicating that up to a third of 
fourteen-year-old girls are not fully developed physically, and as a result of this physical 
immaturity face a real risk of physical injury from sexual intercourse).   
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or psychological injury.147  The latter three concerns even hold true regardless of the 
gender of the minor victim.148  It stands to reason that in adult-minor sexual activity, 
the risk of injury is both serious and foreseeable.  Indeed, courts have rejected the 
argument that the risks of STD transmission and pregnancy associated with statutory 
rape “‘depend upon a speculative chain of events unrelated’” to the age of the minor 
victim or the adult perpetrator.149  Accordingly, the myriad risks inherent to sexual 
activity—risks imposed on minors unable to consent to accepting those risks—
should be considered when determining wither a typical instance of statutory rape 
will involve a serious risk of physical injury and thus fall within the Begay-
Chambers conception of the otherwise clause.  
2.  Sexually Transmitted Disease, Pregnancy, and Poverty 
While incidents of transmission of sexually transmitted diseases (“STDs”) in 
teenage boys have continued to decline, the numbers of similarly-aged girls infected 
with STDs has exponentially.150  In 2008, teenaged girls aged fifteen to nineteen 
accounted for the largest number of the one and a half million reported cases of 
Chlamydia and gonorrhea in the United States.151  As a result of their partially-
developed immune systems and immature physiology, young girls are particularly 
susceptible to STDs from intercourse.152  In fact, a single act of unprotected 
intercourse results in a 1% risk of acquiring HIV, a 30% risk of getting genital 
herpes, and a 50% chance of contracting gonorrhea.153  Further, it is estimated that 
                                                           
 147 See United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that carnal 
knowledge of a child was not a predicate violent felony in light of Begay, but noting that even 
non-forcible adult-minor sexual activity can present grave physical risks to minors).  
 148 See Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., The 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1933, 1959 (1992).  Legislatures and courts have traditionally conceived of statutory rape as a 
gender-specific crime.  See, e.g., Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 
474 (1981) (upholding California’s gender-specific statutory rape law on the basis of 
substantial state interest in preventing teenage pregnancy); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (1998) 
(“A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when . . . being a male, he engages in sexual 
intercourse with a female without her consent.”).  However, the laws of most states are now 
gender-neutral.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (2011) (“A person commits the offense 
of sexual assault in the first degree if . . . [t]he person knowingly engages in sexual penetration 
with another person who is less than fourteen years old.”).  
 149 Thornton, 554 F.3d at 446.  
 150 Sharon G. Elstein & Noy S. Davis, Sexual Relationships Between Adult Males and 
Young Teen Girls: Exploring the Legal and Social Responses, ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE 
LAW (Oct. 1997), available at 
http://new.abanet.org/child/PublicDocuments/statutory_rape.pdf. 
 151 Teen Girls at Higher Risk of STDs: Report, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 16, 
2009, available at http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/sexual-and-
reproductive-health/articles/2009/11/16/teen-girls-at-higher-risk-for-stds-report. 
 152 Brenda Zurita, Girls Beware: Protect Your Transformation Zone, CONCERED WOMEN 
FOR AM., 
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=12368&department=BLI&categoryid=family. 
 153 Elstein & Davis, supra note 150, at 3.  
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seven out of ten teen girls become infected with sexually transmitted diseases as a 
result of sexual relations with men over twenty,154 and an alarming 90% of all HIV 
cases acquired from heterosexual intercourse before age eighteen are in females.155  
These shocking statistics suggest that teenaged girls acquire nearly all STD and HIV 
infections from sexual relationships with older men.156  The susceptibility of young 
girls to the transmission of sexually transmitted disease as a result of intimate 
relations with adult men constitutes not only a serious public health issue that should 
encourage the courts and the legislature to increase the protections afforded to 
teenaged girls against statutory rape, but is also clear evidence that physical harm 
often results from adult-minor sexual relationships because minors, teen girls in 
particular, are physically and physiologically at risk from sexual encounters.157 
Teenage pregnancy also puts teen girls at serious risk of harm and is another 
public health issue that can be addressed through the more vigorous application of 
enhanced sentencing schemes as they relate to statutory rape.  In 2009, more than 
400,000 girls between the ages of fifteen to ninteeen gave birth.158  Due to their 
physical immaturity, these teen mothers are at a considerably higher risk of 
complications from pregnancy, including pre-term labor, pre-eclampsia, low birth 
weight, failure to thrive, and miscarriage.159  To society at large, teenaged pregnancy 
has long been a concern due to its statistical connection to poverty and welfare, high 
drop-out rates, and crime.160  That stringent enforcement of statutory rape laws may 
alleviate these problems is evidenced by troubling statistics indicating that half of the 
fathers of babies born to mothers between the ages of fifteen and seventeen are 
twenty years old or older.161  Further, nearly twenty percent of the fathers of babies 
born to teen mothers are six or more years older than the teen mom, and, in general, 
the younger a mother, the greater the age difference between her and her partner.162 
Finally, because teen mothers impregnated by older men are also 
disproportionately likely to be abandoned by the fathers shortly after conception or 
                                                           
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A 13 year old is 
unlikely to have a full appreciation of the disease . . . risks of intercourse, an accurate 
knowledge of . . . disease-preventive measures, and the maturity to make a rational 
comparison of the costs and benefits of premarital intercourse.”).  
 158 Sexual Risk Behavior: HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, (July 12, 2011) 
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/sexualbehaviors/. 
 159 TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 80-82 (Philip Baker et al., eds. 
2007). 
 160 See generally, KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE 
PREGNANCY (1996) (discussing the ramifications for the individual and society from teenage 
pregnancy); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, 124-
34 (1984) (describing through statistical analysis the social impact of teenage motherhood). 
 161 See David J. Landry & Jacqueline Dorroch Forrest, How Old Are U.S. Fathers?, 27 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 159, 160 (1995). 
 162 See id. at 161. 
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birth, the result is an increased reliance by teenaged mothers on welfare or other 
social programs.163  Young women aged seventeen and under who give birth outside 
of marriage are more likely to go on public assistance and to spend more years on 
welfare once enrolled.164  Between 1985 and 1990, teenage parenthood was 
estimated to have cost the taxpaying public one hundred and twenty million through 
the usage of such programs as food stamps, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children.165  Children of teenaged parents also tend to have lower 
cognitive scores, lower educational aspirations, and a greater likelihood of becoming 
teenage parents themselves.166 
Of course, enhanced sentencing for statutory rape only partially addresses these 
very real and pervasive issues.  However, classifying statutory rape as a violent 
felony is one vehicle that can be used to deter adult predators and protect young girls 
not only from abuse and exploitation, but also from the very real public health issues 
of the transmission of sexually transmitted disease, teenage pregnancy, and the 
reliance on welfare and other public services that are often the end result of such 
predatory relationships.  If statutory rape is considered a violent felony under the 
ACCA, this trend toward fathering children with minor women only to abandon 
those children to poverty could be mitigated.   
B.  “Risk” Versus “Actual” Harm 
As the court points out in United States v. Rodriguez, our concern should not be 
with the existence of any actual harm caused during the commission of a violent 
felony, but rather with the risk that physical harm will occur.167  As Justice Scalia 
adeptly noted in his Begay concurrence, the crux of a determination into whether a 
crime should be one of violence under the “otherwise” clause should rest with the 
correlation between the degree of risk posed between the crime in consideration and 
the enumerated offenses.168  While there must be a similarity between statutory rape 
and burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives, this similarity need only be 
in the degree of risk posed.  Statutory rape meets this test.  A typical instance of 
sexual intercourse carries a significantly higher risk that injury will occur than does a 
typical instance of extortion or burglary.169  Indeed, many burglaries or robberies, the 
enumerated offenses in the statute, can be accomplished without any actual harm and 
in a manner that is not violent or aggressive.  Burglary remains a crime of violence, 
however, due to the risk of physical force, even if “in the particular case the 
defendant’s conduct [did] not create a risk that force will be used—i.e. entering 
through a wide-open door when no one is inside.”170  This is an important distinction, 
                                                           
 163 Elstein & Davis, supra note 150, at 3. 
 164 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, § 101(8)(A), 110 Stat. 2105, 2111 (1996). 
 165 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101(9)(G), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (1996). 
 166 TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, supra note 159, at 80-82. 
 167 United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1992) (“It matters not one whit 
whether the risk ultimately causes actual harm.”). 
 168 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 169 See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
 170 Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404, 408 (2d Cir. 2003).   
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as the requirements under Begay are that the crime typically be of the type that 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.171  Where it involves a sexual 
relationship between an adult and a minor, this risk is nearly always present.  As the 
court stated in United States v. Velazquez-Overa:  
We think it obvious that such crimes typically occur in close quarters, and 
are generally perpetrated by an adult upon a victim who is not only 
smaller, weaker, and less experienced, but is also generally susceptible to 
acceding the coercive power of adult authority figures.  A child has very 
few, if any, resources to deter the use of physical force. . . . In such 
circumstances, there is a significant likelihood that physical force may be 
used to perpetrate the crime.172 
If any given commission of the crime may result in a serious potential risk of 
physical injury, that crime should be considered a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 
Section 924(e) (2006), and this requirement is indeed met in cases of statutory rape. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Begay v. United States has served not to resolve, 
but to exacerbate the confusion regarding what offenses should be considered violent 
felonies under the ACCA.  While, according to Begay, crimes must be purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive, even these terms can be impossible to decipher as they relate 
to any given criminal statute.  Statutory rape is one strict liability crime that, 
generally accepted as a per se crime of violence pre-Begay, is now regarded in 
several circuits as a strict-liability offense that cannot be deemed a violent felony 
post-Begay.  If allowed to continue, this trend will greatly reduce the protections 
against recidivist offenders afforded to minors by enhanced sentencing provisions.  
However, statutory rape does meet the Begay test.  The intentional sex act at issue 
should be sufficient for the conduct to be defined as “purposeful,” and the aggression 
required under Begay is satisfied by the legal definition of “force” as non-consent, 
and the lack of legally-cognizable consent present in a statutory rape.    
Further, statutory rape presents a risk of physical injury equal to that of the 
enumerated offenses of the ACCA.  The risks of physical injury from sexual 
intercourse, transmission of sexually transmitted disease, and pregnancy are 
documented and very real.  Even if every instance of statutory rape does not result in 
such harms, a typical instance of sexual intercourse between an adult and a minor 
will always carry such risks, and it is this risk that courts should be concerned with.  
Coupling these risks with the affirmative act on the part of the perpetrator and the 
lack of legally-cognizable consent raising a presumption of force, the appropriate 
rule as it relates to statutory rape as a predicate felony becomes clear: It is a violent 
crime that satisfies both the ACCA and the Court’s findings in Begay and Chambers.     
As Justice Scalia has stressed, it is incumbent upon the legislature to clarify the 
offenses that it intended to be included in the ACCA.  However, in the absence of 
                                                           
 171 Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45. 
 172 United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 422 (5th Cir. 1996).  The court went 
on to note that it had previously held that burglary is also a per se “crime of violence” under 
2L1.2: “If burglary, with its tendency to cause alarm and to provoke physical confrontation, is 
considered a violent crime . . . then surely the same is true of the far greater intrusion that 
occurs when a child is sexually molested.”  Id. 
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Congress taking such steps, we must begin to view statutory rape in light of the 
substantive crime from which it gets its name—rape.  In the absence of any consent 
recognized by law, sexual intercourse with a minor should be considered a forcible 
crime of violence that will trigger the enhanced sentencing provisions of the ACCA.      
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